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Declarations  Are  Not  Enough: 
Financial  Sector  Sources  of 
Central  Bank  Independence 
1.  Introduction 
Even  before  the  much-cited  restructuring  of  the  Reserve  Bank  of  New 
Zealand  in  1990,  central  banks  had  been  granted  varying  degrees  of inde- 
pendence  from  short-term  political  control.  The  discussion  underlying 
the  current  fad  for  central  bank  independence  has  assumed  that  these 
earlier  choices  about  monetary  regimes  were  made  at random,  either  by 
interpreting  the  negative  correlation  between  average  inflation  rates  and 
indices  of central  bank  independence  as  prima  facie  evidence  of a causal 
relationship,  or by recommending  central  bank  independence  to any  and 
all governments,  be  they  in Paris,  Moscow,  or Karachi.  This  paper  argues 
that  such  an  assumption  of  the  exogeneity  of  monetary  institutions  is 
false.  National  differences  in the  degree  of central  bank  independence  in 
the  postwar  period  resulted  instead  from  differences  in  financial  sector 
opposition  to inflation. 
Everything  in  economics  can  be  construed  at  some  level  as  endoge- 
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nous.  What makes the question  of endogeneity  of central bank indepen- 
dence  meaningful  is the  departure  from what  one  would  expect  if the 
time-inconsistency  models1 usually invoked to explain the negative corre- 
lation between  central bank independence  (henceforth CBI) and inflation 
adequately  captured  the  world  of  monetary  policy.  Most  importantly, 
enhanced  CBI does  not appear to be a Pareto improvement  (even  if on 
balance it enhances  welfare).  Disinflation  costs measured  in unemploy- 
ment not only fail to decrease  under the putatively  more credible mone- 
tary regime of increased CBI, but actually appear to increase (Debelle and 
Fischer, 1994; Posen,  1995; Walsh, 1994); lower inflation, therefore, comes 
at some  group's  expense.  In developing  economies,  differences in statu- 
tory CBI do not appear to predict inflation,  because  some  governments 
pursue  inflationary  monetary  policy  regardless  of statute  (Cukierman, 
1992; Cukierman,  Webb, and Neyapti,  1992), implying  they  still believe 
they  gain from a free hand.2 In other words,  CBI doesn't  please  all the 
people  all the time,  because  there are distributive  consequences  to that 
choice of monetary  regime. 
If there are distributive consequences,  there is no reason to assume that 
the adoption  of CBI is self-enforcing.  The preferences  for price stability 
embodied  by CBI require political support.  If CBI does not embody  such 
preferences,  it will  not affect inflation  over the long run; if such prefer- 
ences  were universally  supported,  independence  would be unnecessary. 
Shifting de jure responsibility  for enforcement  of these  preferences  does 
nothing  to remove  threats to their implementation.  As McCallum (1995) 
puts  it,  "Indeed,  if  the  absence  of  any  precommitment  technology  is 
actually a problem,  then it must apply to the consolidated  central bank- 
government  entity  just  as it would  to an entirely  independent  central 
bank." This is why it is as important to see which societal forces support- 
ing price stability can insure against the risk to monetary institutions  as it 
is to examine  the monetary  institutions  themselves. 
This paper contends  that the financial sector is uniquely  positioned  to 
provide  that  support,  and  central banks  have  been  most  independent 
where  that support has been strongest.  CBI is supported  by the financial 
sector as a long-run  means  to price stability, one for which  that interest 
group  has  no  clear substitute,  but one  that cannot be effective  without 
that group's  ongoing  protection  of its counterinflationary  activities.  Ac- 
1. See Barro  and Gordon  (1983)  and Kydland  and Prescott  (1977)  for the seminal  models of 
why governments should bind their (inflationary)  hands. Rogoff (1985)  models why it 
would be optimal  for some governments  faced  with this dilemma  to set up an indepen- 
dent central  bank, given the particular  set of shocks and constraints  they face. 
2. The  relationship  between  CBI and  inflation  is  shown  below  to  hold  in  developing 
countries  under certain circumstances  (see Section 4). Declarations  Are  Not Enough  ?  255 
cordingly,  the  granting  of  CBI where  neither  the  financial  sector  nor 
some  other  political  force  is  ready  to  defend  it  in  times  of  costly 
disinflation  is  unlikely  to  have  the  intended  counterinflationary  effect 
over the long run. Moreover, changes  in a country's financial or political 
system  will  likely  alter a central bank's ability to pursue  price stability. 
The  argument  is  presented  in  four parts.  In Section  2 I discuss  the 
reasons  for a role in monetary  policy for interest group politics,  and for 
the financial  sector in particular. In Section 3, the elements  of effective 
financial opposition  to inflation are analyzed,  and a composite  measure 
of them  is created.  In Section 4 I test the prediction  that CBI-and  low 
inflation-are  the result of effective  financial opposition,  first on a sam- 
ple  of  17 OECD countries  from 1950 to 1989 used  in prior research on 
CBI, then  on a larger sample  including  those countries and 15 low- and 
moderate-inflation  developing  countries  from  1960 to  1989.  Section  5 
examines  some  specific  implications  for current  developments  of  this 
paper's argument. 
2. An Interests  Model  of  Monetary  Policy 
Why do interests as well as institutions  matter? Obviously, some govern- 
ment  institutions  will be more  subject to risk of change  than others  in 
any  given  country,  with  constitutionally  grounded  bodies  being  most 
secure.  Nevertheless,  even  the United  States Supreme  Court has  occa- 
sionally  tempered  its decisions  for the sake of safety.3 An examination  of 
institutions  must also consider the time frame. In analysis of shorter time 
periods,  institutions  and their effects are likely to remain fixed. As expla- 
nations  are  sought  for  patterns  persisting  over  longer  time  spans, 
however-such  as  the  average-by-decade  differences  in inflation  rates 
under  investigation  in  this  paper  (and  generally  in  the  debates  about 
CBI)-the  possibility  and likely sources  of institutional  change  must be 
taken into account.4 
Thus,  although  a central bank's  monetary  policy  decisions  reflect its 
institutional  capabilities  and  statutory  constraints,  these  decisions  are 
also responses  to the political realities that determine  its autonomy  and 
3. Examples  run from Marbury v. Madison  (1803), where  the court secured  its powers  of 
judicial review  at the cost of allowing  Madison  to dismiss  the Federalists' appointments 
to the  federal  bench,  to Webster v. Planned  Parenthood  (1992), where  the  "moderate 
bloc" held off from overturning  Roe v. Wade's precedent  for the sake of maintaining  the 
court's legitimacy  (a fact made explicit in the majority opinion). 
4. Of  course,  this  political  process  is  itself  partially defined  by  major national  political 
institutions,  such  as constitutions  and  party structures.  I would  argue,  however,  that 
these  differ from policy institutions  both in longevity  and in unresponsiveness  to inter- 
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powers.5  This general view  of monetary  policymaking  rests on four em- 
pirically grounded  assumptions:  first, inflation has significant redistribu- 
tion effects,  with  identifiable  groups  more harmed by inflation; second, 
those  groups  that are most  harmed  (i.e.,  benefit  most  from price stabil- 
ity)  have  the  most  prominent  role  as  lobbyists  over  monetary  policy; 
third,  certain  national  political  structures  determine  the  influence  of 
interest-group  lobbying  on monetary  policy; and fourth,  without  effec- 
tive  lobbying  by  inflation  opponents,  the  political  cost  of  disinflation 
would  lead  to  government  pressure  on  central  banks  to  ease  policy. 
Central bank independence  arises from the desires  of an interest  group 
that  is  more  committed  to  price  stability  than  is  the  median  voter  to 
reducing  the central bank's risk in pursuing  anti-inflationary policies. 
Central bank  independence  can insure  price stability when  effective 
opposition  to inflation establishes  it as a policy goal.6 It is politically and 
practically impossible  for any interest group to bargain directly with the 
government  over  changes  in the  price level-a  central bank offers the 
expertise,  operational  capability,  and  political  legitimacy  necessary  to 
conduct  monetary  policy. In short, neither the politically effective will to 
oppose  inflation,  nor the  statutory means  to pursue  such  a goal,  alone 
can achieve  price stability. Jointly, effective  financial opposition  to infla- 
tion and CBI are sufficient.  In practical terms, this means that CBI should 
increase,  and  inflation  should  decrease,  as an anti-inflationary  interest 
group's  effectiveness  in protecting  counterinflationary  monetary  policy 
increases. 
Isolating  any  one  interest  group  as  the  primary  source  of  effective 
opposition  to inflation in all countries seems,  of course,  limiting.  In any 
society,  a different  coalition  of  interests  may  (seek  to)  lobby  for price 
stability,  including  small  savers  and  pensioners,  importers,  and  mort- 
gage holders.  The choice is eased by the existence  in this policy arena of 
one historically prominent  interest group: the financial sector. 
This sector's  organizational  advantages  over all other interest groups 
5. Just as a politician  must  pursue  reelection  as a goal to achieve  any other goals,  central 
bankers  must  pursue  the  autonomy  to set  monetary  policy  in order to achieve  other 
goals such as price stability over the long horizon. 
6. Throughout  this paper, increasing CBI is taken to be equivalent to increasing the relative 
weight  of  price  stability  over  employment  goals  in  the  monetary  authority's  utility 
function.  This treatment conforms with the conservative  central banker of Rogoff (1985), 
the  explicit  measures  used  by  Cukierman,  Webb,  and  Neyapti  (1992)  and  Grilli, 
Masciandaro,  and Tabellini (1991), and the various institutional changes  modeled  on the 
Reserve Bank of New  Zealand.  As Goodhart (1994) points  out, CBI has to be seen  to be 
strengthening  the central bank's counterinflationary preferences: "Otherwise one would 
have to note that the example of the Central Bank of Russia, independent  of the executive, 
but not mandated  to price stability, would  blow  the empirical correlation between  inde- 
pendence  and low inflation into bits." This point is returned to in Section 4 below. Declarations  Are  Not Enough  ?  257 
in the political discussion  of monetary policy institutions  are significant. 
The financial sector gains access to elected government  and central bank 
officials by being their main external source of information and advice on 
monetary  policy. Even in countries where  banks do not own,  and nomi- 
nate directors to, part of the central bank (as they do in the US), or hold 
regular  meetings  between  financial  sector  association  representatives 
and the central bank decisionmakers  (as they do in Germany), the finan- 
cial sector's  monitoring  of the central bank's actions and top personnel 
plays the most prominent  role in the government's  evaluation  of central 
bank  policy.  This is accomplished  through  public  statements,  personal 
interaction,  employment  of former central bank officials, and providing 
part of the supply  of nominees  for central bank governors. 
Moreover,  financial interests  have long revealed a preference for price 
stability. As  stated  in a report on  the previous  Congress's  debate  over 
proposed  changes  in the U.S. Federal Reserve System: 
If one's goal is to minimize inflation, Fed officials reason, then a sure way to 
achieve  that goal is to have private bankers-who are among the world's  fiercest 
inflation hawks-appoint  the regional  bank  presidents.7 
Academic  economists  have  made  similar assumptions.  Lohmann  (1992) 
interprets Rogoff (1985) in the following  manner: 
Empirically,  the appointment  of a central banker  with a strictly positive E [i.e., 
increased  relative  weight on inflation  stabilization]  might correspond  to selecting 
a central  banker  from the conservative  banking  sector  or deliberately  allowing the 
central banker  to be captured  by the financial community.8 
Bankers' vulnerability  to inflation,  while  not yet fully explained,  is well 
established.  Santoni (1986) finds that, for U.S. money-center  and smaller 
banks, both unanticipated  inflation and the variance of anticipated infla- 
tion  had  significant  negative  effects  on  the  bank share prices  (beyond 
that  of  most  stocks)  from  1962:1 to  1985:4.9 Moreover,  banks  and  the 
financial  system  more  broadly  have  much  to  fear  from  disinflation. 
Sharp changes  in interest  rates of the type brought  about by monetary 
7. Greenhouse  (1993). 
8. Rogoff  (1985) also  refers directly to the financial community  as a source  of this prefer- 
ence,  albeit more briefly. 
9. Using  a  methodology  that  doesn't  distinguish  between  anticipated  inflation  and  its 
variance, Epstein and Schor (1989) find a negative relationship between  bank profits and 
both  unanticipated  and  anticipated  inflation  in the  U.S.  for 1956-1985;  since  the level 
and  variance  of  inflation  have  a positive  correlation,  the  Epstein  and  Schor result  is 
consistent  with  Santoni's  results. 258 *  POSEN 
tightenings  can significantly  diminish  profitability (as illustrated by the 
recent troubles of the U.S. financial sector since the Fed began tightening 
in February 1994). 
3.  Constructing  a Measure  of Effective  Financial 
Opposition  to Inflation 
To establish  the relationship  put forward here between  effective financial 
opposition  to  inflation  (henceforth  FOI) and  CBI,  and  between  FOI 
(through its effect on CBI) and inflation, a consistent  cross-national mea- 
sure of FOI must be designed.  Such a measure  requires a better under- 
standing  of  national  differences  in  financial  and  political  systems.  In 
particular, two questions  must be answered:  What determines  the unity 
of financial  sector  distaste  for inflation? What makes  a financial  sector 
more effective  in opposing  inflation? 
Following  Olson  (1965),  self-interested  actors are more  likely  to en- 
gage in collective  political action when  the benefits  to each actor exceed 
that actor's costs of contributing to the effort, and when  member partici- 
pation  can  be  monitored.  Therefore,  it is  important  to  establish  what 
determines  a country's  financial sector's distaste for inflation and capac- 
ity  for  collective  action,  since  not  all  countries'  financial  sectors  are 
equally vulnerable  to harm from inflation.  As more financial firms share 
a similar  outlook,  the  costs  of  pursuing  a group  goal  and  monitoring 
participation  become  lower,  and  a financial  sector  pressure  group  be- 
comes  more viable. 
This emphasis  on unity leads to the first source of cross-country varia- 
tion in the strength  of financial interest in price stability: Financial  sectors 
with universal banking  should express  stronger  anti-inflationary  sentiment than 
those without. To the  extent  that  customers  switch  sources  of  external 
capital as inflation changes  (say from debt to equity, as in Fischer, 1982), 
universal banking  systems  allow that switching  to occur within financial 
firms, so no competitive  divide exists among financial subsectors in their 
reaction to inflation.  Moreover,  universal banking  systems  have an eas- 
ier organizational  path  to  political  consensus  on  all issues,  as they  al- 
ready face unified  regulations  and markets. 
The number  of goals  the interest  group  pursues  is another  source  of 
differential  effectiveness  in  financial  sector  opposition  to  inflation,  as 
specialization  lowers  costs: Financial  sectors  less under the regulatory  power 
of the central bank should express stronger opposition to inflation than those 
under central bank oversight. Where  the  monetary  authority  restricts the 
allocation of credit or lending  rates, or where it has supervisory responsi- Declarations  Are Not Enough *  259 
bilities  for banks,  individual  firms may come into conflict with  the cen- 
tral bank.  They  may  seek  to limit the central bank's powers;  they  may 
lobby for a general credit easing  to circumvent specific regulatory limits, 
despite  the inflationary  effect; or they may wage  individual  battles with 
the central bank.  Conversely,  when  the central bank has no bank super- 
visory  responsibilities,  the  financial  sector  has  no  distraction  from its 
support  of the central bank's autonomy. 
It may  appear  a bit counterintuitive  to  state  that it is better  for the 
central bank's  pursuit  of independence  that it have less  direct leverage 
over prospective  allies.  When the financial sector interacts with the cen- 
tral bank  solely  over  monetary  arrangements,10 however,  the  sector's 
only potential  loss is lobbying  activities which do not recoup the sector's 
costs.  By allowing  the central bank to pressure  the financial sector be- 
yond community  of interest in price stability, the sector's opportunity  set 
changes.  It may  then  be  better  for  the  financial  sector  to  devote  its 
lobbying  resources  in  the  policy  arena to removing  the  central bank's 
leverage,  rather than to push  for sufficient CBI. 
When measuring  a political system's  openness  to interest-group  influ- 
ence,  it must be known  who  decides  on policy goals within that system, 
and who  implements  them.  The answers  can be termed a political sys- 
tem's  discipline of  legislating  and  its  centralization  of  policy  execution. 
Discipline  characterizes  the extent  to which  a government's  top elected 
officials  (e.g.,  prime  ministers,  party leaders)  can get  the legislature  to 
pass their initiatives  without  alteration. Centralization is the key to how 
actual day-to-day  policy is set, whether by the elected officials directly or 
by delegated  bureaucrats or even  indirectly by private groups. 
The  concept  of  legislative  discipline  stems  from  Buchanan  and 
Tullock's  (1962) vision  of  the  legislative  process  in  democracies.  Self- 
interested  legislators  will  extract from  the  initiators  of  any  legislative 
proposal  side payments  up to the value of their votes  to the initiators- 
even  if  the  bill  serves  their  own  interest.  Where  parties  are fewer  in 
number,  or party  discipline  is higher,  the  number  of veto  points  (and 
possible  sources of amendment)  is lower; where parties increase in num- 
ber, individual  members  increase in importance,  and points  of access to 
legislative  decisionmaking  (and therefore logrolling) increase. 
The basic measure  usually  invoked  by political scientists  to character- 
ize the spread and number of parties in a legislature is fractionalization, 
defined  as the probability that any two randomly selected legislators will 
10. This, of course, abstracts  away from the central bank's roles as clearinghouse  and 
lender of last resort. For purposes of this paper, it is presumed that the former  role 
always proceeds without dispute, and the latter  role trumps  any other concerns  when 
it is invoked-neither  enters day-to-day  monetary  politics. 260 * POSEN 
come  from different  parties.11 As fractionalization increases,  local inter- 
ests  tied to particular parties or to even  particular members'  constituen- 
cies should  see  their particularistic goals better served by the legislative 
process.  As  fractionalization  decreases  and  legislative  decisionmaking 
shifts  to the  (fewer)  national  party leaders,  interests  organized  at a na- 
tional  level  with  claim  on  these  leaders'  time  will  have  more  voice.12 
Given  the  financial  sector's  interest  in  a national  issue  (price stability) 
and  claims  to  expertise  (speaking  of  financial  market  "confidence"  in 
various  measures),  we  can predict that where a country's party system is 
less fractionalized,  financial opposition  to inflation  should be more  effective. 
Similarly, centralization  of policy execution  is measured  by the extent 
of access to policymakers  by interests other than the elected government 
after initial legislation  has been  passed.  The more the government  dele- 
gates its policy execution,  the more it allows  policy outcomes  to diverge 
from its intents,  largely due to difficulties in monitoring.  Moreover, since 
the implementation  of policy  always  involves  a great deal of discretion- 
ary interpretation  and  reaction  to current events,  decentralized  policy 
may  force the  implementing  institutions  to turn to sources  other  than 
those  the  elected  government  might  have  chosen  for information  and 
support.  In a decentralized  system,  private interest  groups  have  more 
avenues  of influence  upon  policy. 
The most  marked  form of decentralization  of a political  system  is to 
structure it as a federal state. Although  this decision is usually motivated 
by  ethnic  or regional  cleavages,  it has  the  general  effect  of insulating 
what are assigned  as purely national issues-such  as monetary policy- 
from numerous  other  policies  and  of encouraging  delegatory  forms  of 
policy implementation.  In addition,  federalism denies  access to national 
issues  except  to  those  groups-such  as  the  financial  sector-that  can 
offer a unified  front across regions.  Although  federalism is perhaps not a 
necessary  condition  for policy decentralization,  it is a sufficient one. 
Therefore, financial opposition  to inflation  should  be more  effective  in federal 
systems of government. The  design  and  creation  of  the  Bank deutsches 
Lander, the  forerunner  of  the  Bundesbank,  in  postwar  West Germany 
illustrates  this  point.  The occupying  U.S.  military encouraged  the Ger- 
man government  to avoid  giving  power  to the central German govern- 
ment  and  to build  the  power  of civil society  (i.e.,  private interests  and 
11. See Rae (1967) and Powell (1982). Fractionalization equals one minus the (perhaps more 
familiar) Herfindahl-Hirschman  concentration  index. 
12. Party organization  is  not  the  only  factor that  determines  legislative  discipline  in  a 
country, simply  the most stable and easily observable.  A more nuanced  set of measures 
would  pick up such events  as the increased power of individual  senators and represen- 
tatives  in the U.S.  Congress  since  the 1974 "sunshine"  reforms,  despite  the continua- 
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associations)  in  all  their  arrangements  of  new  institutions.  When  the 
monetary  reform of 1948 required the creation of a new  central bank to 
replace  the  defunct  Reichsbank,  it was  consciously  organized  along  fed- 
eral lines,  with  institutionalized  channels  of financial sector voice.  This 
same  approach  was  taken  in  the  creation  of  the  U.S.  Federal Reserve 
System  by those  concerned  with centralized power. 
In summary, the effectiveness  of a financial sector's opposition  to infla- 
tion  should  be  seen  as resulting  from the  unity  of its interest  in price 
stability, and of the openness  of its country's  political system  to interest 
group influence.  As with  CBI, the measurement  of qualitative economic 
and political factors that contribute to effective FOI is best done  without 
illusions  of precision.  For use in the statistical investigations  in the next 
section,  I construct an index of effective financial opposition  to inflation- 
denoted  Effective FOI-composed  of the component  measures: 
Univbk  =  1 if banks  are allowed  to  deal  in  at least  two  of  securities, 
insurance,  and commercial lending,  = 0 otherwise;13 
Regpow  = 1 if banking supervision  is not under the central bank, = 0.5 if 
it is shared  by the central bank and another agency,  =  0 if it is solely 
the central bank's responsibility;14 
Federal =  1 if a country has a federal political structure,  = 0 otherwise;15 
Fractn =  the  probability  that two  legislators  chosen  at random  from a 
national legislature  belong  to different parties.16 
In accord with  this section's  discussion,  a greater value for each of the 
first three components  is assumed  to represent a greater unity  (Univbk, 
Regpow)  or effectiveness  (Federal) of financial opposition  to inflation, 
while a greater value of Fractn is presumed  to diminish effectiveness.  This 
Effective FOI index is set equal to Univbk + Regpow  + Federal -  Fractn, 
and thus can run from -1  to 3. A higher value of Effective FOI indicates a 
greater effective  financial opposition  to inflation in that country. 
Using  these  definitions,  values  for  the  Effective  FOI index  and  its 
components  were established  for a set of 32 low- and moderate-inflation 
countries,  on  a decade-by-decade  basis  from 1960 to 1989.17  Seventeen 
13. Assembled  from various sources; a country-by-country  list is available from the author. 
14. The data for Regpow  for the OECD countries  are taken from Grilli, Masciandaro,  and 
Tabellini (1991); those  for non-OECD countries  are taken from national sources. 
15. Taken from Political Atlas of the World,  various years. 
16. Values  for  the  OECD  countries  were  taken  from  Grilli, Masciandaro,  and  Tabellini 
(1991); values  for the non-OECD countries were computed  directly from Political  Atlas of 
the World,  various years. 
17. Moderate  inflation  was  defined  as 10-year averages  of under  30% a year, as in Dorn- 
busch  and  Fischer  (1993).  In  the  interest  of  brevity,  the  individual  country-decade 262  POSEN 
OECD  countries  were  included  (Australia,  Austria,  Belgium,  Canada, 
Denmark,  France, Germany, Greece,  Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, 
New  Zealand,  Spain,  Switzerland,  the United Kingdom,  and the United 
States)18 as well  as fifteen  Asian  and Latin American  developing  coun- 
tries that did  not  suffer  from hyperinflation  for more than a decade  of 
the period examined  (Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Hong Kong, India, Indo- 
nesia,  Malaysia,  Mexico,  Pakistan,  the  Philippines,  Singapore,  South 
Korea, Thailand,  Turkey, and Venezuela).19 
Observations  where  a  country's  decade-average  inflation  rate  ex- 
ceeded  30%/year (Indonesia  in the 1960s, Chile in the 1970s, and Bolivia, 
Mexico,  and Turkey in the  1980s) were  excluded  from the sample.  The 
Effective FOI index  for the remaining  90 observations  has a mean value 
of  0.92,  a  standard  deviation  of  0.78,  and  a minimum  value  of  -0.48 
(South Korea in the 1970s), and a maximum value of 2.81 (Belgium in the 
1980s).  Country  observations  for periods  when  average  inflation  levels 
were driven up by hyperinflationary  outbreaks are excluded,  as they are 
believed  to  be  situations  where  the  process  of,  and  support  for,  dis- 
inflation are likely to differ from the course described in this paper.20 
Turning to the seventeen  OECD countries  coded  (a subsample  useful 
for comparison  to the earlier CBI literature) and extending  the index back- 
wards to the 1950s, there are 68 observations of Effective FOI, with a mean 
value of 1.05, a standard deviation  of 0.86, and a range from a minimum 
value  of  -0.23  (Italy throughout  the  era) to a maximum  of 2.81  (again 
Belgium  in  the  1980s).  The  distribution  of Effective  FOI in  the  OECD 
subsample  and in the larger sample do not appear to differ substantially. 
4.  The  Effective  FOI  Index  as a Predictor  of Central-Bank 
Independence  and  Inflation 
There is clear statistical evidence  to support drawing a causal link (rather 
than a mere association)  between  more effective FOI on the one side and 
observations  are not reported here. A full list of the measurements  is available from the 
author. 
18. The  same  seventeen  countries  included  in  the  samples  of  Grilli, Masciandaro,  and 
Tabellini (1991) and of Alesina  and Summers  (1993). 
19. Singapore  was  coded  beginning  in the  1970s, as in the  1960s it was  a member  of the 
Malaysian Federation. 
20. As persistent hyperinflation  induces  changes  in the economic  structure of society, finan- 
cial sectors in a repeatedly  hyperinflationary  economy  can be expected  to adapt to their 
environment,  and to change  their relationship  with inflation rather than oppose  it. On 
that basis Brazil and Argentina,  while  coded,  were excluded  from this paper's sample 
for statistical purposes.  The consistency  of these countries' experience with the spirit of 
this paper is discussed  in Section 4. Declarations  Are  Not Enough  ?  263 
greater CBI and  lower  inflation  rates on  the other. The index  Effective 
FOI proves  to be a significant  predictor of CBI. Although  this is only  a 
correlation, it is hard to imagine a first-order causal argument that can be 
drawn from CBI to the various components  of Effective FOI, so the argu- 
ment  in  the  other  direction  made  here  is  presumed  to  hold.  Further- 
more,  FOI predicts  average rates of inflation significantly, although  CBI 
does  not,  when  both  factors  are accounted  for.  CBI's commonly  pre- 
sumed  ability to lower inflation, independent  of the central bank's politi- 
cal context,  is not supported  by the data. 
One measure  of CBI is used  throughout  this section: Cukind,  Cukier- 
man's  (1992) measure  "LVAU" (legal variables aggregate  unweighted). 
The other major published  indices  of statutory CBI-Bade  and Parkin's 
(1988), Grilli, Masciandaro,  and Tabellini's (1991), and Alesina and Sum- 
mers's  (1993)  averaging  of  those  two  on  a  four-point  scale-do  not 
appear  to  be  as  reliable  as  Cukierman's  index,  which  goes  into  finer 
level  of  detail  and  captures  the  limited  but  real variation  of  CBI over 
time.  In fact, Cukierman's  index  has a higher correlation with  inflation 
in the other authors'  own  samples  than their own  CBI indices  (Cukier- 
man,  Webb, and Neyapti,  1992). Moreover, Cukind has been computed 
for a wider  range  of countries,  allowing  for analysis  of the relationship 
among  FOI, CBI, and inflation beyond  the subset  of the OECD usually 
examined.21 
The predicted  effects  of Effective FOI-that  CBI is greater  when FOI is 
greater,  and that inflation  is lower  where  FOI is greater-are  tested by examin- 
ing  the  cross-national  panel  formed  by decade-by-decade  observations 
of FOI and its components,  Cukind,  and inflation  (computed  from CPI 
figures in IMF International  Financial  Statistics) for the 32 countries in this 
paper's  sample.  In the full sample,  Cukind has a mean  of 0.36,  with  a 
standard deviation  of 0.16 (Cukind is designed  to run from 0 to 1), while 
inflation  has  a mean  of 7.8% per annum,  with  a standard  deviation  of 
5.5%.  In  the  OECD  subsample,  Cukind  has  a  mean  of  0.39,  with  a 
standard  deviation  of  0.16,  while  the  mean  inflation  is  5.3%,  with  a 
standard deviation  of 3.1%. 
The  null  hypothesis  is the  one  assumed  by the literature to date  on 
CBI:  that CBI is not meaningfully  endogenous  to effective financial oppo- 
sition to inflation  (or to any other factors for that matter). As evidence  in 
21. The FOI index  developed  in  this  paper  and  its components  significantly  predict  the 
other three measures  of CBI. For example,  an OLS regression  of the Alesina-Summers 
index on FOI and a constant  for OECD sample observations  by decade over 1950-1989 
yields  a significant  (at the 0.5% level) positive  coefficient on FOI, with an adjusted R2  of 
0.50.  In a regression  of the Alesina-Summers  index on the FOI components  using  the 
same  sample,  all coefficients  have  the  predicted  sign,  and  all but  the  coefficient  on 
Fractn are significant  at the 1% level,  with an adjusted R2  of 0.53. 264  POSEN 
support of this paper's model of monetary policy, I will take a significant 
positive  coefficient  on FOI in equations  estimating  CBI, and a significant 
negative  coefficient  on FOI in equations  estimating inflation when  CBI is 
also  included  as an explanatory  variable.  In addition,  all equations  are 
estimated  with  the  components  of  FOI as  explanatory  variables;  the 
coefficients  on  Univbk,  Regpow,  and Federal are predicted  to have  the 
same sign as that on Effective FOI, while the coefficient on Fractn should 
have the opposite  sign. 
To control for factors beyond  the interactions  of our variables of inter- 
est,  indicator  variables  are  introduced  to  control  for  decade-specific 
shocks  across  countries  and for regional  effects.  In addition,  a variable 
equal  to one  for any  decade  in which  the  country  was  a member  of a 
fixed-exchange-rate  regime for more than 5 years, and zero otherwise,  is 
included  in regressions  where  inflation is the dependent  variable. Since 
inflation  shows  an upward  trend over the  1950-1989  period  even  after 
controlling  for decade-specific  shocks,  all equations  where  inflation  is 
the dependent  variable are estimated  by weighted  least squares,  where 
the observations  are weighted  by an index number by period (e.g.,  1950s 
=  1, 1960s =  2). All equations  where  CBI is the dependent  variable are 
estimated  by ordinary least squares. 
The main  test  of this  paper's  argument  is determining  the  ability of 
FOI to explain CBI levels and inflation rates in the same OECD sample as 
that used  to establish  the much-cited  negative  correlation between  CBI 
and inflation (Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini, 1991; Alesina and Sum- 
mers,  1993). In keeping  with the literature on CBI, Figure 1 plots CBI and 
inflation  against  FOI for the  seventeen  countries'  average  values  over 
1950-1989.  The predicted relationships  appear clearly. 
Turning to more formal explorations  of the relationships  in question, 
Table 1 shows  the results  of OLS regressions  of Cukind upon  Effective 
FOI and  its  components,  both  with  and  without  decade-specific  vari- 
ables.  Membership  in a fixed-exchange-rate  regime  is also included,  in 
case this form of government  commitment  to monetary restraint substi- 
tuted for CBI.22  The results strongly support the role of financial interests 
in  determining  CBI. The  coefficient  on  Effective  FOI is  positive  and 
significant  at the 1% level in both equations  (I and III) where  it appears. 
In equations  II and  IV, each  FOI component's  coefficient  has  the  pre- 
22. Since membership  in a fixed-exchange-rate  regime proves  to have no predictive power 
for CBI in  either  the  OECD  subsample  (see  Table 1) or in  the  broader  sample  (not 
shown),  these  two  forms  of  institutional  constraint  on  monetary  policy  cannot  be 
considered  substitutes.  This  result  is  worthy  of  further  examination,  given  that  it 
implies  either  that at least  one  of these  does  not enhance  credibility in its commonly 
presumed  manner,  or that governments  have  a strange  utility  function  in monetary 
regime benefits. Declarations  Are  Not Enough  *  265 
Figure  1 CENTRAL  BANK  INDEPENDENCE  AND LONG-RUN  AVERAGE 
INFLATION,  OECD COUNTRIES,  VERSUS  EFFECTIVE  FINANCIAL 
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dicted  sign,  with  all  but  Regpow  significant  at  the  1% level  in  both 
equations.  To  get  some  sense  of  the  magnitudes,  note  that  a  one- 
standard-deviation  increase  in FOI will increase Cukind by nearly two- 
thirds of a standard deviation  (0.10). 
Given the clear picture of Table 1, the similarly supportive  evidence  of 
Table 2 for this paper's predictions  comes  as no surprise. The coefficient 
on  Effective  FOI is negative  and  significant  at the  1% level  in all three 
equations  estimating  inflation by (time) weighted  least squares where  it 
appears  (V, VII, IX), whether  or not Cukind,  fixed-exchange-rate  mem- 
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Table  1  CENTRAL  BANK  INDEPENDENCE  AND EFFECTIVE  FOIa 
Equation  I  II  III  IV 
Constant  0.263b  0.316b  0.276b  0.333b 
(0.024)  (0.028)  (0.054)  (0.052) 
Eff. FOI  0.119b  0.119b 
(0.018)  (0.018) 
Univbk  0.197b  0.200b 
(0.032)  (0.034) 
Regpow  0.060  0.058 
(0.034)  (0.036) 
Federal  0.133b  0.130b 
(0.032)  (0.033) 
Fractn  -0.543b  -0.532b 
(0.164)  (0.170) 
1950s  0.013  0.018 
(0.052)  (0.048) 
1960s  0.009  0.014 
(0.052)  (0.048) 
1970s  -0.012  -0.018 
(0.058)  (0.055) 
Fixed  exch.  -0.023  -0.033 
(0.064)  (0.062) 
No.  of obs.  68  68  68  68 
Adj. R2  0.392  0.485  0.355  0.453 
S.E. reg.  0.126  0.116  0.130  0.119 
a Observations-averages by decade, 1950-1989,  17 OECD  countries.  Dependent  variable:  central  bank 
independence  LVAU  (Cukierman,  1992).  Estimated  by ordinary  least squares.  Standard  errors  given in 
parentheses. 
Significant  at the 1%  level. 
bership,  or decade-specific  effects  are included.  In the other three esti- 
mated equations,  coefficients  on all FOI components  have the predicted 
sign,  with  the  coefficients  on  Regpow  and  Federal being  significant  at 
the 5% level  or better in each equation. 
Cukind never has a significant coefficient in equations predicting infla- 
tion as long  as Effective FOI is included,  and it shows  a positive  coeffi- 
cient in three  of the  four equations,  contrary to the expectations  of the 
institutions-only  literature. The adjusted values  of R2  for equations  V-X 
are  comparable  to  those  of  published  regressions  of  inflation  on  CBI 
without  FOI. The picture certainly seems  to be one where  the FOI index 
captures  the correlation with  inflation  normally associated  with  CBI. A 
one-standard-deviation  increase in Effective FOI drops inflation by 1.3% 
per year, about 40% of a standard deviation. 
Is the relationship  among FOI, CBI, and inflation specific to industrial- 
ized  democracies?  This question  is of interest not only to assure us that Declarations  Are Not Enough ?  267 
Table 2  INFLATION AND  EFFECTIVE  FOIa 
Equation  V  VI  VII  VIII  IX  X 
Constant  0.087b  0.085b  0.086b  0.087b  0.060b  0.062b 
(0.007)  (0.008)  (0.010)  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.013) 
Eff. FOI  -0.015b  -0.015b  -0.015b 
(0.004)  (0.005)  (0.004) 
Univbk  -0.002  -0.001  -0.009 
(0.008)  (0.010)  (0.009) 
Regpow  -0.025b  -0.024b  -0.021b 
(0.008)  (0.009)  (0.007) 
Federal  -0.020b  -0.019c  -0.014c 
(0.008)  (0.008)  (0.007) 
Fractn  0.057  0.053  0.039 
(0.039)  (0.043)  (0.037) 
Cukind  0.002  -0.007  0.008  0.003 
(0.028)  (0.030)  (0.023)  (0.026) 
Fixed Exch.  -0.023b  -0.028b  -0.023b  -0.028b  0.019C  0.013 
(0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.009)  (0.010) 
1950s  -0.033b  -0.030b 
(0.011)  (0.011) 
1960s  -0.031b  -0.029b 
(0.009)  (0.009) 
1970s  0.037b  0.034b 
(0.009)  (0.009) 
No.  of obs.  68  68  68  68  68  68 
Adj. R2  0.239  0.295  0.227  0.284  0.475  0.470 
S.E. reg  0.029  0.028  0.029  0.028  0.024  0.024 
a Observations-averages by decade, 1950-1989,  17 OECD  countries.  Dependent  variable:  inflation 
(average  annual rate). Estimated  by weighted least squares (by period). Standard  errors  given in 
parentheses. 
Significant  at the 1%  level. 
c Significant  at the 5%  level. 
the  relationship  among  FOI,  CBI,  and  inflation  is  not  somehow  an  arti- 
fact  of  the  particular  OECD  sample  examined,  but  to  ascertain  CBI's 
applicability  as  a  norm  for  monetary  arrangements  in  transitional  and 
developing  economies  (as many  advocate).  Until  now,  the  only  statistical 
examination  of  CBI and  inflation  to  include  developing  countries  in  its 
sample23  indicated  that  statutory  CBI was  not  effective  against  inflation 
outside  the  OECD. 
This  section's  statistical  investigations  show,  however,  that  when  the 
focus  is  limited  to  those  countries  with  low  or moderate  inflation  rates, 
yet  irrespective  of their  developing  country  status,  the  relationships  pre- 
dicted  do  exist  (albeit  more  weakly  than  in  the  solely  OECD  sample). 
23. Cukierman  (1992) and Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti  (1992). 268 *  POSEN 
Table  3  CENTRAL  BANK  INDEPENDENCE  AND EFFECTIVE  FOIa 
Equation  XI  XII  XIII  XIV  XV  XVI 
Constant  0.271b  0.250b  0.202b  0.152b  0.206b  0.155b 
(0.024)  (0.032)  (0.030)  (0.039)  (0.038)  (0.044) 
Eff. FOI  0.093b  0.082b  0.082b 
(0.020)  (0.019)  (0.019) 
Univbk  0.119b  0.117b  0.117b 
(0.033)  (0.030)  (0.031) 
Regpow  0.082c  0.009  0.009 
(0.035)  (0.036)  (0.036) 
Federal  0.086c  0.109b  0.109b 
(0.034)  (0.031)  (0.031) 
Fractn  -0.022  0.017  0.018 
(0.076)  (0.079)  (0.080) 
OECD  0.099b  0.146b  0.099b  0.146b 
(0.034)  (0.037)  (0.034)  (0.037) 
Latin  Amer.  0.165b  0.205b  0.166b  0.205b 
(0.048)  (0.053)  (0.049)  (0.053) 
1960s  -0.006  -0.002 
(0.037)  (0.036) 
1970s  -0.007  -0.006 
(0.036)  (0.035) 
No.  of obs.  90  90  90  90  90  90 
Adj. R2  0.186  0.180  0.285  0.333  0.268  0.317 
S.E. reg.  0.148  0.149  0.139  0.134  0.140  0.136 
a Observations-averages  by decade,  1960-1989,  32 countries  with no inflation  >30%/year' for more 
than  one  decade  (hyperinflations  omitted).  Dependent  variable: central bank independence  LVAU 
(Cukierman,  1992). Estimated by ordinary least squares. Standard errors given  in parentheses.  b  Significant at the 1% level. 
c Significant at the 5% level. 
Table 3 shows  the results of replicating the estimations  of Table 1 for this 
paper's  32-country  sample  from 1960 to 1989, allowing  for common  ef- 
fects across country groups  (OECD, Asia, Latin America). 
Effective FOI has a positive,  significant  (at the 1% level) coefficient in 
all three regressions  (XI, XIII, XV) in which  it appears.  A one-standard- 
deviation  rise in Effective FOI (0.78 in this sample) leads to a rise of over 
40% of  a  standard  deviation  in  Cukind  (0.07).  Univbk,  Regpow,  and 
Federal have  the predicted  positive  sign in the three equations  in which 
they appear, with  Univbk and Federal always  significant at the 5% level 
or better.  As  in  Table 1,  Regpow  does  not  seem  to be  independently 
important  for CBI. Unlike in the OECD sample,  the independent  effect 
of Fractn on CBI disappears  (perhaps because including nondemocracies 
in the sample  makes party structures less important). Declarations  Are  Not Enough 269 
Table  4  INFLATION  AND EFFECTIVE  FOIa 
Equation 
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a Observations-averages  by decade,  1960-1989,  32 countries with no inflation >30%/year for more 
than  one  decade  (hyperinflations  omitted).  Dependent  variable: inflation  (average  annual  rate). 
Estimated by weighted  least squares (by period).  Standard errors given  in parentheses.  b Significant at the 1% level. 
c Significant at the 5% level. 
Table 4 shows  the  results  of replicating  Table 2's estimations  for the 
broader sample,  with  additional  regressors  allowing  for country-group 
effects.  Effective FOI always has the predicted negative coefficient, falling 
just short of the 5% significance  level in equation  XIX, but significant in 
the other two regressions  where it appears. Regpow, Federal, and Fractn 
have the predicted  signs in each equation in which they appear, with the 
coefficient  on Federal significant  in all equations.  Again,  Cukind never 
has  a significant  negative  coefficient  (in fact,  the  coefficient  is  always 
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per's predictions,  even  when  low- and moderate-inflation  (but not high- 
or hyperinflation)  non-OECD  countries are included  in the sample. 
A useful  distinction  between  countries  on the basis  of average  infla- 
tion  levels  is  difficult  to  reconcile  with  the  literature  on  CBI to  date. 
When  monetary  institutions  alone  are  seen  as  explanatory  variables, 
there is no reason  to think that CBI offers less of a commitment  to price 
stability for a country  in the throes  of hyperinflation  than for a country 
with an inflation rate in the teens,  once the transition between  regimes is 
made.  CBI should  predict  inflation  for  all  countries  (assuming  some 
reasonable  scaling of the range of inflation outcomes)  in that framework. 
When  it does  not,  factors  external  to  the  model  must  be  invoked24 to 
justify a distinction  between  OECD and non-OECD countries-a  distinc- 
tion that this section's  results show  to be misleading. 
In contrast,  the  empirically  supported  distinction  between  countries 
by inflation  levels  arises  logically  out  of the  argument  offered  here.  A 
country with persistent  high inflation or hyperinflation will have a finan- 
cial sector that gave up opposing  inflation long ago. To survive,  banking 
and other financial firms would  have adapted to their monetary environ- 
ment and would  now  likely support  continued  inflation. And those attri- 
butes  of  the  country's  financial  and  political  system  which  would  en- 
hance  effective  financial  opposition  to  inflation  in  a  less  inflationary 
environment  then enhance  this support for inflation.  With its main pro- 
tector joining  the  forces  for ease,  an independent  central bank cannot 
pursue  a  sustained  counterinflationary  policy;  statutory  CBI will  not 
affect  inflation  in  this  case.  The  pattern  of  which  countries'  inflation 
levels  correlate negatively  with CBI is explained by the incentives  facing 
the financial sector. 
This pattern is best illustrated by Brazil, which has been suffering from 
hyperinflations  for much  of  the  postwar  period.  Brazilian banks  have 
invested  heavily in automation and local branches to cope with the pace of 
price shifts,  committing  them  to a structure suitable for hyperinflation. 
They have  reaped large profits from lending  to the government  and ag- 
gressively  managing  the float. In fact, with the recent introduction of the 
new  Brazilian currency, the real, bank profitability dropped.  Importantly, 
Brazil is a federal  state,  which  had universal  banking  in the  1970s and 
1980s, and only moderate  party fractionalization.  Brazil would  lie almost 
24. For example,  Cukierman  (1992) attributes the OECD-non-OECD  distinction  in part to 
a  "norm  of  general  adherence  to  the  law," which  is  asserted  to be  "probably more 
deeply  rooted  in developed  Western  democracies  than in absolute  regimes  or newer 
democracies"  (p. 454). Declarations  Are Not Enough *  271 
one standard deviation above the mean on the FOI index. It is perhaps no 
coincidence  that Brazil has had less success removing hyperinflation  than 
its neighbors.25 
5. Implications:  Monetary  Policy  When  Interests 
Delimit  Institutions 
My fundamental  argument-that  CBI levels  reflect national differences 
in effective  financial opposition  to inflation-rejects  the assumption  that 
the  pattern  of CBI seen  prior to 1989 was  random.  As a result,  central 
banks with comparable statutory independence  as a matter of planning, 
rather than political pressure,  will offer significantly differing degrees  of 
protection  from inflation  over time as the political situation alters. Both 
central bank independence  and a coalition in society  committed  to pro- 
tecting  that  independence  are  necessary  to  achieve  the  low  inflation 
heretofore  ascribed solely  to CBI; either alone is insufficient. 
An  analogy  can  be  made  to  the  United  Kingdom's  entry  into  the 
European  Monetary  System  in  October  1990 at what  proved  to be  an 
unsupportable  deutsche-mark-pound  exchange rate of 2.95, and its sub- 
sequent  exit in September  1992. The tying of hands  by the government 
through  the  EMS failed  to induce  changes  in the British economy.  The 
plan  to  create  price  stability  would  only  have  worked  the  other  way 
around,  with  the  structural  changes  made  allowing  adherence  to  the 
exchange  rate.  Granting  CBI in  countries  unready  for  strong  coun- 
terinflationary policies  may be a similar exercise in limiting reach only to 
find no expansion  of grasp. 
This paper's  interests  analysis  also implies  that heretofore  seemingly 
unrelated  changes  in  the  organization  of financial  markets  or political 
debate  will  affect  inflation  rates.  On  the  financial  side,  deregulation 
toward  universal  banking  and  disintermediation  by  financial  firms 
place  conflicting  pressures  on  the  interest  of  the  financial  sector  in 
opposing  inflation.  The  net  outcome  of these  trends  will  have  macro- 
economic  effects  by  influencing  financial  support  for  disinflationary 
policies.  On  the  political  side,  the  tendency  toward  decentralization 
within  European  countries,  and  towards  European  federalism  in  gen- 
eral,  should  increase  price stability by insulating  financial influence  on 
monetary  arrangements. 
25. I am  grateful  to John Williamson  for first suggesting  I consider  the  phenomenon  of 
inflation-loving  Brazilian banks.  The details  of Brazilian banking  tactics described  in 
this  paragraph  were  taken  from  Financial Times, March 21,  1990; LDC Debt Report, 
September  5, 1994; and The Banker,  January 1995. 272 *  POSEN 
Interestingly,  from this  standpoint,  the  anti-inflationary  effect  of the 
proposed  European  Central Bank should  be quite large. Because finan- 
cial  supervision  will  not  come  under  its  responsibilities,  the  financial 
sector should  rarely come into direct conflict with it. Moreover, the over- 
whelming  majority  of  European  national  financial  interest  groups  al- 
ready support  it explicitly in hopes  that it will suppress  their respective 
domestic  inflations.  As a symbol  of European unity, and enshrined  in a 
virtually  sacrosanct  international  treaty, the  European  Central Bank is 
secure  from attacks  on  its  structure and  existence  to  an extent  no  na- 
tional central bank is ever likely to be.26 Finally, Europe's supranational 
federalism  should  limit influence  upon  its decisionmaking  to the most 
organized  and recognized  interests. 
My explanation  of the  cross-national  inflation  differences  usually  at- 
tributed to CBI alone  does  not imply  that the structure of central banks 
is irrelevant,  or that the financial sector is the only external influence  on 
monetary  policy.  Instead,  my emphasis  on the political power  of inter- 
ests  in  society  and  the  conflictual  basis  of inflation  should  be taken to 
identify  central bankers' actual role in setting  macroeconomic  policy: as 
experts  who  must  ascertain the actual and future state of the economy, 
as  well  as  select  the  targets  and  instruments  necessary  to  achieve 
agreed  upon  goals.  What matters most  is what  central banks  can actu- 
ally do,  not whether  they  appear to be a "commitment  technology"  for 
an  elected  government  in  the  world  described  by  Barro-Gordon  and 
Kydland-Prescott. 
Furthermore,  the success  of this paper's model in predicting both CBI 
and  inflation  leads  to  two  suggestions  for  future  studies  of  macro- 
economic  policy.  First, monetary  economics  might  find it fruitful to re- 
examine  the  distributive  conflict over monetary  policy  arising from the 
real costs to interest groups of inflation and disinflation. Treating inflation 
solely as the result of a representative  agent's fears about the government 
springing inflationary surprises upon it is only occasionally appropriate at 
best.  Second,  it would  be useful  to add a cautionary element  to institu- 
tional explanations  of long-run patterns in policy, as well as to recommen- 
dations of institutional  solutions  for macroeconomic problems. Although 
institutional  factors certainly determine some outcomes,  especially in the 
short  to medium  term,  consistent  policy  outcomes  over time  may well 
depend  as much upon  consistent  political contexts for those institutions 
as upon  the institutions  themselves. 
26. That is, unless  European unity were to be taken for granted. If EU rule were to become 
largely unquestionable,  its perceived  fragility to alteration of one of its building blocks 
would  decrease,  and the European Central Bank might lose some of its supplementary 
protection  from risk. But that is a very long-term concern. Declarations  Are Not Enough *  273 
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